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Abstract
European Works Councils (EWCs) constitute the most developed arena of social dialogue in 
the EU’s multi-level system of employment relations. In this paper we give an overview over the 
quantitative trajectory of these representation bodies and evaluate the potential for their future 
development. Based on the historical development of the legal framework since the 1980s we es-
tablish a four phase periodization with different motives and dynamics in the creation of EWCs. 
Using the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) database on EWCs we look at several com-
pany characteristics that might have an effect on EWC creation such as country of origin, com-
pany size and degree of internationalisation. Our findings confirm a strong relationship between 
the development of the European legal framework and EWC creation dynamics. We argue that 
the current voluntaristic soft law approach without clear binding obligations for the companies 
covered by the EWC Directive is one of the main factors to explain the currently very low EWC 
creation rate in a context of growing internationalisation of firms and industries.
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Introduction
Th e European level of industrial relations has evolved in the last twenty years as a 
potential tool for employee representatives and trade unions to defend workers’ rights 
in companies operating in the European Union1. In times of corporate globalisation 
there is a need for labour to recover bargaining power and actual political infl uence 
over corporate decision-making (Boni 2012). For that purpose, we agree with da 
Costa et al. (2012: 13) that Europeanization is ‘a central direction for furthering of 
trade union interest representation in the future’. As national systems of employment 
relations are suff ering what Arrowsmith and Pulignano (2013) call a common process 
of fragmentation, the EU-level instruments for information and consultation are 
becoming even more important for employee representatives throughout Europe.
Since the adoption of Directive 94/45/EC by the European Council in September 
1994, European works councils (EWCs) have been the spearhead of European 
industrial relations. In the past 20 years since the EWC Directive, over 1000 
multinational companies have established a proceeding to provide information 
and consultation rights to their European workforces. EWCs constitute the most 
developed arena of social dialogue in the EU’s multi-level system of employment 
relations. Other arenas, such as the European social dialogue both at intersectoral 
and sectoral levels have not had the same impact on the reality of working life in 
Europe. 
Th e history of EWCs reaches back around thirty years as the fi rst proto-EWCswere 
installed already in the 1980s. Th is article takes a critical look at three decades of EWC 
development. Most authors only take into consideration the time aft er 1994, the year 
in which the EU laid the legal ground for EWCs. We also include the historical phase 
before in which pioneering experiences in European worker participation were made. 
Th is period is oft en neglected because it was only aft er 1994 that the quantitative 
evolution of EWCs took on pace. 
Th e regulation on EWCs was revised in 2009 in order to adapt the legal piece to 
the changes in employee representation practice. Th e Recast Directive 2009/38/EC 
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modifi ed the legal procedure for establishing and operating EWCs, adapted the initial 
defi nitions given to information and consultation rights, clarifi ed the transnational 
competence of these bodies and reserved a specifi c role for trade unions with regard to 
the support and technical advice of employee representatives. Both legal pieces have 
supported in two diff erent periods a very intense process of creation of in-company 
structures for the representation of employee interests within transnational fi rms.
Th e EWC regulation has clearly created the necessary legal ground for worker 
representation in the EU though it has not lead to a common standard of information 
and consultation practice across works councils. Arguably, there exists considerable 
convergence in the architecture of EWCs on paper: as of 2012, 93 percent of all new 
agreements installing a EWC use as a blue print the so called fall back provisions of 
the 1994 Directive (ETUI 2013: 101). Where original agreements had stayed behind the 
minimum standards of the 1994 Directive (which was the case for many of the EWCs 
installed before the coming into force of the fi rst Directive in 1997), trade unions had 
the opportunity to renegotiate agreements since the 2009 Directive. Th ey indeed 
managed to improve EWC competencies in half of all the cases of renegotiation 
until 2012 (ETUI 2013: 102). Th is shows the importance of both the robust minimum 
standards provided by the 1994 Directive (ETUI 2013: 104) and the right to 
re-negotiate agreements given by the 2009 Directive. However, the literature on 
EWCs highlights the diversity of forms and operations underlying the actual exercise 
of these rights. In the absence of eff ective sanction mechanisms, agreed standards are 
not always respected by the companies (Jagodzinski 2014). 
As the quality of information and consultation varies greatly among EWCs, so 
does the assessment of this instrument by social partners (Waddington 2011). EWCs 
have turned into an unsatisfactory experience for some practitioners and experts 
while for others they are still the most promising and advanced process in European 
industrial relations with a lot of positive fulfi lments yet to come. In this regard, 
a signifi cant number of references have focussed on the qualitative dimension of 
EWCs, aiming at identifying and discussing the institutional and organizational 
factors that encourage or hinder an appropriate development of these structures as 
bodies for information and consultation of employees (Platzer et al. 2001; Lecher et 
al. 2002; Eurofound 2004; 2006; 2015; Kotthoff  2006; Whittall et al. 2007; Hauser-Ditz 
et al. 2010; inter alia).
Th is stream of the literature has been supported by a less traceable group 
of references which are aimed at providing a general picture of the process of 
establishment of EWCs in transnational fi rms (Eurofound 1998; 2000; 2001; Kerckhofs 
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2002; 2006). We aim to contribute to this quantitative body of literature by shedding 
some light on the evolution of the number of EWCs in diff erent periods of time. 
Th is article undertakes a quantitative evaluation of active EWCs, using data from 
the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) EWC database. We are interested in the 
quantitative outreach of EWCs: how many EWCs have been installed at diff erent 
points in time and what explains variations in the growth rate during the past thirty 
years. We evaluate the impact of the phases of creation of EWCs as established in 
the calendar of the European regulation, on the quantitative development of EWCs. 
We argue that by looking at both the European legal framework and the nature of 
existing EWCs we can identify potential reasons why many companies covered by 
the Directive still do not have an EWC installed. Th ese missing EWCs are our key 
concern (Blokland 2002).
Th e structure of the article will be as follows. Aft er this introduction, in section 
two of the article, we give an overview over the unfolding of legal dispositions in 
Directives 94/45/EC and 2009/38/EC. Th ese Directives have signifi cantly conditioned 
the path and pace of the activity in setting up European works councils. In our 
historical and legal overview we distinguish between four phases in the evolution of 
EWCs since the 1980s. In section three we will examine the linkages between these 
phases and the establishment of new bodies for information and consultation of 
employees in companies with a European dimension. In addition to those historical 
factors we also assess the explanatory value of company-specifi c factors such as the 
sector, size of workforce, degree of internationalization or company home country. In 
section four we examine the overall quantitative picture today. Th e empirical evidence 
is derived from the ETUI database on EWCs. In the fi nal section we present the most 
important conclusions from our data analysis. Our fi ndings clearly point out that 
EWCs are not developing their full potential concerning quantitative outreach and 
that there is a need to further investigate what are the reasons for this blockade. We 
argue that weaknesses in the existing legal framework are an important explanatory 
factor for the quantitative underdevelopment of EWCs. 
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1. Thirty Years of  EWC Regulation. 
   The Changing Legal Framework for Employee 
   Representation at European Level
In the last thirty years of EWC development we distinguish four phases, following 
the legal milestones of EWC legislation set by the European Commission. Th e fi rst 
period starts in the 1980s with so called proto-EWCs that were established in absence 
of any legal anchor and ends with the release of a fi rst Directive on EWCs in the year 
1994. Aft er that, many new EWCs were created on a still voluntary basis before the 
coming into force of the respective legislation in 1996. Th e next historical landmark 
was constituted by a recast Directive on EWCs in 2009. Clearly, the fi rst phase before 
1994 was characterized by real voluntarism while the second, third and fourth phase 
on the contrary were marked by the unfolding of a legislative framework established 
by Directive 94/45/EC and the recast Directive 2009/38/EC. Table 1 below provides 
an overview over the four phases and summarizes the main characteristics of each 
phase. Concerning the names of the four phases we are inspired by the labelling 
established by Müller and Platzer (2003).
1.1. Before Directive 94/34/EC. 
       The Age of  Pioneers (1983−1994)
Th e process of the creation of European Works Councils started almost ten years 
before the adoption of Directive 94/45/EC which established the fi rst legal framework 
for the creation of EWCs. Th is fi rst phase is characterized by real voluntarism as the 
fi rst experiences of worker representation on European level originated in completely 
autonomous and voluntary initiatives from few companies (Müller and Platzer 2003).
Th e fi rst structures of worker participation were orientated towards the exchange 
of information as bodies of corporate communication. Th ese proto-EWCs became 
the principal source of inspiration for the European regulation on information and 
consultation that was to follow later (Rivest 1996). Müller and Platzer (2003: 61) point 
out that any structuration of the process of creation of EWCs should take into account 
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these pioneering experiences of worker representation that were created before the 
establishment of a legal framework. 
Th ese experiences had an important impact on the strategies of actors and the 
opportunities and limitations deriving from the 1994 Directive which constituted a 
clear point of no return. Th ey also constitute important social dynamics that have 
had an impact on the normative framework and on the practical implementation of 
the norms through EWCs aft er 1994.
Table 1. Establishment of EWCs 1983−2014. Legal framework and periods
I 
Real 
voluntarism
II
Politically reinforced 
voluntarism
 III
Regulated 
voluntarism
IV
Revised 
Voluntarism
Years 1983a (10/1985b) 
to 1994
19941996 19962009 since 2009
Legal 
basis
Voluntary 
agreements in 
the absence of a 
legal framework
Article 13 of 
Directive 94/45/EC
Article 6 of 
Directive 94/45/EC
Recast Directive 
2009/38/EC
Nature 
of new 
EWCs
Proto-EWCs 
in companies 
based autonomy
EWCs voluntarily 
established, often 
management-
initiative
slow growth of 
number of EWCs; 
initiative turned 
from managers to 
employees
EWCs established 
under the revisited 
directive
a First informal meetings of worker representation at EU-level (Saint-Gobain). 
b Signature of the fi rst agreement on the creation of a proto-EWC (Th omson Grand Public).
Source: adaptation from Müller and Platzer (2003); González Begega (2011).
Th e rise and consolidation of these fi rst experiences in worker representation on 
the European level can be seen as a reaction to the failure of the respective projects 
of the European Community for the regulation of information and consultation 
rights since the 1970s (González Begega, 2011). Trade unions were worried by the 
standstill of this regulatory project aft er the rejection of the Vredeling Directive 
in 1983. Th is explains to a certain extent the appearance of proto-EWCs aft er 1983. 
French companies were the fi rst ones who installed these pioneering EWCs. Müller 
and Platzer (2003) and also Salkin (2002) explain this with the existence of favourable 
pre-conditions under French labour law aft er the introduction of the so called Lois 
Auroux. It was through an inter-organizational learning process that the initiatives 
of a small number of French companies extended to other companies from Germany 
and from Nordic countries. Th us the French national experience was transformed to 
55Three Decades of European Works Councils. A Quantitative Evaluation
a genuinely transnational process which formed the practical basis that inspired the 
European Commission to adopt a legal framework for European Works Councils in 
1994 (Lecher, Nagel and Platzer 1999).
1.2. A Window of  Opportunity. 
       Politically Reinforced Voluntarism (1994−1996)
Th e adoption of the EWC Directive 94/45/EC in September 1994 constitutes a legal 
milestone that initiates the second phase of the creation of EWCs. Th e Directive 
determines the required procedures to install an EWCs as well as basic rules for 
information and consultation. Aft er the transposition into national law of this 
Directive by the end of September 1996, all EWCS installed had to respect the 
respective rules and procedures which led to a visible window of opportunity eff ect. 
Th is legal piece established important incentives to install a European Works Council 
in its article 13 which releases existing EWCs or similar bodies for the purposes of 
information and consultation of employees installed before the coming into force of 
the Directive of the duties laid down in the rest of the directive. Th e EWC Directive 
94/45/EC only came into force in September 1996. 
Th e introduction of article 13 of the Directive served two objectives. One the 
one hand, the aim was to allow for the adaptation of existing experiences and proto-
EWCs to the new legal framework on information and consultation. On the other 
hand, the European Commission wanted to make sure that as many companies as 
possible would accept this new legal framework with the result of a rapid growth in 
new EWCs. 
Indeed, article 13 led to an unprecedented growth in the number of new EWCs 
aft er 1994. Between 1994 and 1996 there existed very few legal requirements for the 
installation of new EWCs. During this period, the only requirement was a formal 
written agreement to establish a European body of worker representation that had 
to include a vague reference to the information and consultation rights established 
in the Directive. Concerning the actual content of EWC agreements reached in 
those days, the legal regulation merely plays a role of external reference or source of 
inspiration. As a result, the agreements on the creation of an EWC reached during 
this period, just as those reached before 1994, are very much characterised by the 
power relations between management and employee representatives in each company. 
Given the heterogeneity and fl exibility of negotiation processes, in many cases it is 
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diffi  cult to determine the actual degree of worker participation in the creation of an 
EWC and to fi nd out whether real negotiations have taken place or not (González 
Begega 2011).
Th e management of many transnational corporations considered the blunt 
legal requirements of article 13 as an opportunity for the installation of European 
level bodies of worker representation while avoiding any major commitments from 
management side. In fact, in many cases it was the central management board that 
initiated negotiations with employee representatives over the creation of an EWC. 
Trade unions took a pragmatic stand point in accepting the rather unsatisfactory 
provisions of article 13 in order to ensure a rapid expansion of the instrument of 
EWCs (Lecher, Platzer, Rüb, Weiner 2002).
1.3. Directive 94/34/EC into force. 
       Regulated voluntarism (1996−2009)
Th e third phase in the evolution of EWCs starts with the coming into force of 
Directive 94/45/EC in September 1996. It has to be taken into account that many 
countries delayed the transposition into national law until later than 1997. However, 
for many companies in the EU installing EWCs based on completely voluntary 
agreements, as those of the proto-EWCs, was not possible any more aft er that year. 
From that moment on, negotiations towards the creation of new EWCs had to respect 
the provisions laid down in article 6 of the Directive. 
As a result, the negotiation of an EWC agreement became a regulated process, 
subject to time limits and with the mandatory outcome of a European level body of 
worker participation. Once demanded by employee representatives, an EWC now 
had to be installed within the given time frame of three years even if management 
and employee representatives could not reach an agreement. In that case, the legal 
minimum standards of the Directive concerning composition and functions of the 
EWC would apply.
Th e coming into force of the demanding and binding legal framework meant 
end the of the ‘window of opportunity’ eff ect: at least for management, incentives to 
install an EWC had largely disappeared (Nakano 2004; Gilman, Marginson 2004). 
Article 6 of the Directive off ered eff ective negotiation rights to employee 
representatives and gave them the capacity to determine the content of the EWC 
agreement on an equal footing with management. We can see a clear loss of interest 
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from employers and employees aft er the year 1996 and as a result a slump in the 
growth of new EWCs. In addition to that, the loss of interest can also be traced down 
to factors independent of the legal framework. Platzer, Rüb and Weiner (2001) point 
out among them the fact that in the group of TNCs with a genuine interest in having 
a European Works Council now many were equipped with one. So the number of 
large companies that could or should install an EWC but had not done so yet was 
getting smaller and these missing EWCs were not easy to identify and target for trade 
unions (Blokland 2002).
Th e period of regulated voluntarism ended with Directive 2009/38/EC which 
constituted a new normative milestone in the evolution of EWCs. Th is legal piece was 
adopted in May 2009 and came into force in 2011.
1.4. Developments under Directive 2009/38/EC. 
      Revised Voluntarism (2009−2015)
Directive 2009/38/EC amended the information and consultation rights for employee 
representatives in European Works Councils. Th e Directive laid special ‘emphasis the 
timely conveying of information by management, which is obliged to transmit it to 
the EWC at a stage early enough for employee representatives to analyse and prepare 
for consultations’ (Jagodzinski 2009: 127). Another key upgrade is that the Directive 
obliges management “to transmit information required for starting negotiations for 
an EWC (in particular information about the structure of the undertaking or the 
group and its employees)’ (Jagodzinski 2009: 128). 
It seems by the year 1996 that the pool of companies interested in establishing 
a body of information and consultation on the European level had been largely 
exploited by trade unions. Th e resulting stagnation in the creation of new EWCs 
could not be overcome aft er the 2009 Directive. In the years before 2009 trade 
unions had suggested to create some kind of formal register for companies covered 
by the EWC regulation in order to be able to identify and target those companies 
(Buschak 2004; ETUI 2008). Th e aim was to further enhance the coverage of the EWC 
legislation through the creation of new EWCs. 
Th e fi nal text of the recast Directive did not include the trade union proposal 
concerning the registration of companies. Such a register would have allowed for the 
identifi cation of potential EWCs, especially in small and medium-sized transnational 
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companies. It would also have improved the visibility of existing bodies of information 
and consultation on the European level (González Begega and Köhler 2011).
2. The Evolution of  EWCs Since the 1980s. 
    From Boom to Stagnation
In absolute numbers, the overall picture suggests a steady growth in the number of 
existing EWCs in the last two decades. Th is development is visualized in the bars 
of Figure 1. However, the number of newly installed EWCs, as indicated in the line 
crossing the bars, varies signifi cantly for each year. Th e line highlights the impact of 
the 1994 Directive on the number of newly created EWCs, with almost four hundred 
new EWCs only in the year 1994. Interestingly, while we can clearly see a window of 
opportunity eff ect around the year 1996, created by the fi rst EWC Directive (94/45/
EC), such an eff ect is largely absent in the years around the revised EWC Directive 
(2009/38/EC)2.
Figure 1. EWCs active and EWCs newly installed per year 1985–2013
 
 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
EWCs active EWCs newly installed
Source: own compilation based on ETUI EWC database, www.ewcdb.eu
2 ETUI EWC Database is not completed for 2014. Th ere exist the possibility that some EWCs are 
not captured. Nor does it account for the several EWC agreements currently under negociation.
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In Figure 2 we have grouped newly installed EWCs according to the four phases 
in the development of the legal framework (outlined in the previous section of 
this paper). What we can see here is that aft er the phase of pioneer or proto EWCs 
(1983–1993) with below fi ft y newly installed EWCs, the comparatively short phase 
between 1994 and 1996 has seen an exponential growth with almost fi ve hundred new 
EWCs which can be easily traced back to the coming into force of Directive 94/45/
EC in the year 1996. Between 1996 and 2008 we also fi nd an impressive number of 
just over fi ve hundred new EWCs but we have to take into account that this involves 
a much longer time frame than the phase of politically reinforced voluntarism from 
1994 to 1996. 
Figure 2 EWCs newly installed in each period 1985–2013
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Source: own compilation based on ETUI EWC database, www.ewcdb.eu
Since 2009 not even one hundred new EWC agreements have been completed 
which constitutes an annual growth rate below the one aft er 1997. So the EWC 
growth eff ect of the 2009 Directive is a far cry from what we have seen aft er the 1994 
Directive. It is easily understandable why management did not have an interest in 
supporting an EWC aft er the window of opportunity eff ect of the fi rst Directive had 
worn out. What is rather puzzling is the absence of strong trade union initiatives for 
new EWCs, given the improved standards for information and consultation under 
new regulation. Th e available data clearly shows that the 2009 Directive has not 
created incentives for the creation of new EWCs comparable to those responsible for 
the impressive growth rate aft er 1994. Th e obvious question is therefore, what kinds 
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of incentives are missing from the current legislation and what other factors apart 
from the legislation infl uence EWC creation.
Th e legal milestones set by the European Commission in 1994 and 2009 are the 
most obvious but certainly not the only factors that can explain the installation of 
new EWCs. Other relevant legal milestones are the three rulings by the European 
Court of Justice that deal with information and consultation rights as well as national 
jurisprudence (Moreau 2008). Also, it is necessary to take into account some company 
specifi c factors in order to see whether some companies in the past have been more 
willing to install EWCs than others. Indeed, when accounting for headquarter 
country, degree of internationalization and size of workforce, we fi nd that there are 
important variations between fi rms that have installed an EWC in the last twenty 
years (Kerckhofs 2002; 2006). 
Th e EWC database groups companies with EWCs installed according to their 
degree of internationalisation in three distinct categories. One group is formed by 
large TNCs with operations in more than ten countries of the European Economic 
Area (EEA), a second group contains those companies with a medium level of 
internationalisation which are active in fi ve to ten EEA countries and a third category 
is formed by least internationalised companies with up to fi ve foreign operations. 
Figure 3. EWCs newly created by degree of internationalisation 1985–2013
Source: own compilation based on ETUI EWC database, www.ewcdb.eu
As can be seen in Figure 3, companies with diff erent degrees of internationalisation 
have rather similar EWC growth rates (new bodies installed per year) throughout the 
years, with common peaks in the window of opportunity years around 1994−1996. 
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Th ey also show another similar, though much smaller, high point of growth 
around the years 1997–1999 due to the window opportunity eff ect of Directive 
97/75/EC, which extended European regulation on information and consultation of 
employees to British companies. On the other hand, there is no visible infl uence of 
the 2009 Directive as an important legal milestone when it comes to the degree of 
internationalisation of the fi rms having EWCs. Results are largely congruent when 
grouping companies by workforce size. Especially large companies (more than 10,000 
employees) experience unusually high numbers of new EWCs around the year 2000. 
Middle-sized companies (5000 to 10,000 employees) and small employers (below 5000 
employees) do show similar increases in their EWC growth rate around the same time 
but the overall number of EWCs is smaller than for large companies which makes it 
diffi  cult to relate the workforce size to specifi c peaks in the quantitative development 
of EWCs. We do not display the respective graph here due to its similarity with Figure 3.
Th e picture looks slightly diff erent when taking into account the country of origin 
of fi rms with EWCs installed. Figure 4 provides an overview over the number of 
newly installed EWCs for companies headquartered in the United States, Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom over time. 
Obviously there are many more headquarter countries but for reasons of 
visibility and reliability, we selected the four most frequent headquarter countries 
among EWCs today. From each of these countries we have more than one hundred 
companies with an EWCs installed while for most other countries the rate is below 
fi ft y (ETUI database 2014). 
What we can see in fi gure 4 is that apart from the unsurprising common peak 
in the years 1994−1996 we fi nd several other high points of EWC growth that diff er 
from one headquarter country to another. Germany shows a clear peak just before 
the 2009 Directive which can be interpreted as an isolated window of opportunity 
eff ect of the Directive 2009/38/EC on German multinationals. It has to be taken into 
account that British companies have been covered by the EWC legislation only aft er 
1997. Th rough Directive 97/75/EC, the European Commission granted companies 
from the United Kingdom an extension for the creation of EWCs under the rather 
blunt legal provisions of article 13 Directive 94/45/EC. Th is certainly plays a role in 
the re-activation of new EWCs between 1997 and 1999. 
However, as we can see in fi gure 4, companies headquartered in Germany, France 
or the United States have shown similar growth rates concerning new EWCs in the 
same years. Th e inclusion of the United Kingdom in the EWC legislation does not 
distort the overall fi gures because companies from other headquarters were just as 
willing to install an EWC in those years: the window of opportunity eff ect worked for 
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many countries, not only for the United Kingdom. All companies show high points 
between the years 1998 and 2001 which is largely congruent with the fi ndings above 
on degree of internationalisation and workforce size. Apart from these two peaks, 
trajectories vary a lot from one headquarters country to the other. Th e inclusion of 
new member states into the European Union aft er 2004 has not created a visible 
growth in the creation of EWCs. In fact, new member states are among the least 
represented nations when it comes to headquarters countries of EWCs in existence.
Figure 4 EWCs created by year & country of Headquarters 1985–2013 
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3. Current EWCs Development. 
    Stable But Stagnating Institutions?
Clearly the amount of around 1150 European works councils today is impressive 
when compared with the year 1990 when only twelve EWCs were active. Of course 
the absolute numbers do not tell us anything about the degree to which EWCs are 
developing their full potential concerning the scope of the EWC Directives. In order 
to make an assessment of the success or failure of the quantitative outreach, we have 
to look at the compliance rate. By compliance rate we mean the number of companies 
covered by the respective legal framework that actually have an EWC installed.
Th e overall compliance rate throughout the EU is estimated to be between 
40 and 65 percent (Kerckhofs 2006; Jagodzinski 2011; Waddington 2011; González 
Begega 2011). However, an accurate estimation of the EWC coverage rate is diffi  cult 
due to the voluntaristic nature of the Directive. For once, there is no formal register 
of corporations falling under the Directive so their total number throughout the 
European Union remains unknown (ETUI 2008). One central problem here is the 
lack of transparency concerning the structure and geographic scope of corporations 
(Whittall et al. 2008). Moreover, management and employees can decide on the 
creation of an EWC without informing the European Commission or the ETUI. 
Th erefore there cannot be complete certainty that all EWCs are included in the ETUI 
EWC database. 
It is clear however that the full compliance rate has not been reached: there are still 
many employees out there who are legally entitled to information and consultation 
rights at the European level through the instrument of a EWC. Management is 
sometimes not willing to make statements on the real size of the corporate workforce 
and has indeed in some cases been forced to hand out the respective information 
to employee representatives through rulings of the European Court of Justice 
(Jagodzinski 2011: 210). Th erefore, workers want to know whether they are entitled 
to demand a European works council and are reportedly denied their right to know. 
Waddington (2011: 75) estimates an increase in the coverage of around one percent 
per year which basically means the number of EWCs is growing at snail’s pace. In 
the light of these arguments we fi nd it rather peculiar that, as Whittal, Lücking and 
Trinczek (2009: 547) point out, ‘the non-implementation of the Directive remains 
... unnavigated territory’. Th e European Union has created a legal framework to 
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encourage the creation of EWCs but until today is not making an eff ort to evaluate 
whether the legal incentives have actually developed their full potential or not.
Figure 5. EWCs by headquarter country
Source: own compilation based on ETUI database www.ewcdb.eu
When we look at the headquarter countries of fi rms that have installed an EWC, 
German fi rms clearly lead the row, followed by companies from the United States, the 
United Kingdom and France. Figure 5 gives an overview over currently active EWCs 
by country of headquarter. Th e picture is less impressive when it comes to national 
coverage rate. As mentioned above, the lack of knowledge on the total number of 
companies in each country covered by the Directive renders a reliable assessment 
of the saturation rate impossible. However, according to the ETUI database, only 
around thirty percent of all German companies eligible to an EWC have actually 
installed one and also in France and the UK the saturation rate is below or around 
forty percent.
Figure 6 below shows the level of compliance on basis of national comparison as 
of 20143. Here we see for selected member countries which have participated in the 
process since 1994 (1997 in the case of the UK) the number of companies with a EWC 
3 Permission to quote the ETUI EWC Database compliance rate indicator granted by ETUI.
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installed in relation to the total number of companies covered by the Directive in the 
respective country.
Figure 6. Compliance Rate per country (selected) 2014
Source: own compilation based on ETUI database, www.ewcdb.eu
For the German situation, Whittal, Lücking and Trinczek (2009) have pointed out 
that in many German companies employee representatives do not see the added value 
of a European works council as they consider their national channels of participation 
in the corporate management to be suffi  cient. Th ey are not very afraid of the intra-
fi rm competition from other European subsidies as they ‘appear confi dent that they 
already have the ear of central management’ (Whittal, Lücking, Trinczek 2009: 559). 
As can be seen in Figure 7, companies that operate in more than ten countries 
have installed more than half of the works councils in place today. Companies with 
a high degree of internationalization form the biggest group of companies with 
EWCs installed. Providing for thirty percent of all EWCs, companies operating 
in fi ve to ten EEA countries form the second biggest group. Less internationalized 
companies, below fi ve foreign operations, only represent fi ve percent of all EWCs. 
So many of the large companies throughout Europe count with an EWC as an arena 
where employee representatives exercise their rights of information and consultation. 
Clearly, large multinationals are easier to locate and target by trade unions which 
therefore ‘have tended to concentrate resources on larger, internationalised, and high-
profi le companies’ (Waddington 2011: 63). However, the total number of companies 
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covered by the EWC Directive is unknown. So in how far the high number of EWCs 
from large companies constitutes a high compliance rate for these companies is still 
an open question (Kerckhofs 2002; 2006).
Figure 7. Active EWCs 2014 by degree of internationalization (2014)
Source: own compilation based on ETUI EWC database, www.ewcdb.eu
Th e picture looks a bit diff erent concerning workforce size, another indicator 
introduced in Kerckhofs (2002; 2006). Figure 8 shows all EWCs installed by size of 
workforce in the EEA. Interestingly, small companies with less than 5,000 employees 
provide for almost forty percent of all EWCs while another forty percent are installed 
in large companies of more than 10,000 employees. On the reasons for this one can 
only speculate, but it is possible that employee representatives themselves in medium-
sized companies from 5,000 to 10,000 employees do not see a particular added value 
from the installation of an EWC and fear the unpredictable amount of additional 
workload connected with transnational co-operation (Jaeger 2011: 6)4.
4 Th e diff erentiation between small (>5,000 employees EEA), medium (5,000–10,000 employees 
EEA) and large-size companies (<10,000 employees) is based on the analysis made in the ETUI EWC 
database.
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Figure 8. EWCs active by category of employment (2014)
Source: own compilation based on ETUI EWC database, www.ewcdb.eu
EWCs might not be the preferred arena of employment relations for all employee 
representatives in all companies at all times. Th e fact remains however that once 
installed an EWC is hardly ever dissolved later. Figure 9 gives an overview over 
reasons for the dissolution EWCs as of 2014. Accounting for almost eighty percent 
of all dissolved EWCs, the most important triggers to dissolve an EWC are mergers 
and acquisitions which in most cases lead to the merger or re-creation of EWCs. In 
nine percent of all cases the reasons for the dissolution of an EWC are unknown, four 
percent are due to the conversion into a Euro-company (Societas Europaeas, SE) with 
the resulting need to form a new EWC according to the changed company structure. 
Only one percent of all dissolutions happen due to a loss of interest by representatives 
of management of employees. Th is suggests that actors once convinced of the utility 
of the EWC as their chosen instrument of transnational employment relations hardly 
ever change their mind in the course of time. Th is is despite all problems connected 
with processes, agreements and implementation in EWCs (Waddington 2011). So 
there is visible potential for persisting fi rm-level industrial relations and micro-level 
social dialogue through EWCs.
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Figure 9. EWCs dissolved by reason for dissolution, 2014
Source: own compilation based on ETUI database www.ewcdb.eu
Conclusions. The Need for a New Push
We have given an overview over the quantitative trajectory of EWCs and evaluated 
the potential for their further development. In relation to the normative regulation 
framework we have established a four-phase periodisation in which each phase was 
characterised by diff erent motives and dynamics in the creation of EWCs. Using 
the ETUI EWC Database, we then examined several variables that might have 
an eff ect on EWC creation such as country of origin, company size and degree of 
internationalisation. We fi nd that these company variables do have some impact on 
transnational worker representation as large, highly internationalised companies are 
most likely to install an EWC. However, the most impressive growth in the number of 
EWCs can be observed during the window of opportunity period, between 1994 and 
1996. Th is clearly indicates that the most important incentive to create a European 
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body of worker representation is the legal pressure on companies exercised by the 
European Commission. 
EWCs can be considered today as mature transnational institutions of worker 
representation with more than 20 years of development to look back at. Commonly 
they are referred to as the most far reaching transnational industrial relations body 
giving the employees of transnational companies information and consultation 
rights at European level. Th e EWCs installed show a considerable stability with many 
of them working for more than a decade. Th e EU enlargement provided few new 
EWCs but many existing EWCs renegotiated their structure and composition now 
including representatives from the new member states. In a context of underdeveloped 
industrial relations and representation structures, typical for the new EU members, 
these experiences may enhance the social parties to develop more eff ective bargaining 
institutions. Th e institutional stability of existing representation bodies builds a sharp 
contrast to the low dynamics of EWC creation.
Our analysis confi rms a strong relationship between the legal regulation 
and EWC creation dynamics. Th e window of opportunity eff ect of article 13 EC 
Directive 94/45/EC motivated the high number of EWCs set up in the years 1995 
and 1996. Th e possibility to set up an EWC without any legal rules or requirements 
constituted a strong incentive particularly for management initiatives to establish 
more symbolic EWCs without eff ective participation rights. A further explanation 
for the exceptional dynamic in this period may be the novelty of a legal framework 
to set up representation bodies in companies with existing participation structures 
such as the group works councils in German companies (Gesamtbetriebsrat or 
Konzernbetriebsrat). With the coming into force of the Directive at the end of 1996, 
this window of opportunity eff ect disappeared and particularly the management lost 
incentives to take the initiative to create an EWC. Some argue that the lack of new 
EWCs aft er 2009 “can be easily explained by the degree of uncertainty concerning the 
legal status and requirements of the newly recast Directive 2009/38’ (Jagodzinski 2011: 
205). However, the stagnation in the growth of new EWCs does not originate with the 
2009 recast Directive but can be traced back to the year 1996 when the eff ect of Article 
13 of the Directive wore out. In consequence, the missing EWCs will not be created 
under the current legislation because they lack incentives to do so (Blokland 2002).
Th e relation between the legal framework and overall EWC growth is an 
important research result as it points out that purely voluntary initiatives without 
a legal framework have clear limits concerning both growth and impact. Th e 
voluntaristic soft  law approach of the Directive without clear binding obligations 
for the companies covered is one of the main factors to explain the very low EWC 
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creation rate since then in a context of growing internationalisation of companies and 
industries. Th e revision of the Directive in 2009 upgraded some parts of the initial 
Directive, particularly concerning the information and consultation procedures, 
but had no visible eff ect on the creation of new EWCs. Th e same holds true for 
the EU enlargement of 2004 with 12 new member states and a growing number of 
companies potentially covered by the Directive but few new EWCs installed. Given 
the structural confl ict of interests between labour, interested in eff ective regulation, 
and capital, interested in deregulation impeding collective representation, legal 
pressure is essential for the development of transnational representation structures. 
Th e failure of earlier attempts since the 1970s confi rms this stance. 
Certainly, various practical problems and the lack of eff ectiveness may explain 
part of the current stagnation in the growth of new EWCs. Th erefore, even on the 
labour side the interest and eff ort to set up EWCs is oft en rather modest due to the low 
value added by transnational bodies without eff ective bargaining and participation 
rights, which at the same time generate costly and time consuming management 
problems for trade unions and local works councils. Th e growing literature on 
qualitative case studies reports many barriers and diffi  culties in the practical work 
of EWCs, which limit their operative abilities and effi  ciency: 
Meetings are only once a year, agenda setting is dominated by the management, 
resources are scarce (no permanent secretary, no steering committee), language and 
cultural barriers impede communication, local self-interests undermine transnational 
solidarity, lack of bargaining competence degrades EWCs to mere symbolic bodies 
with no concrete means of representing workers’ interests, etc. (Köhler, González 
Begega 2011: 146). 
Th is might slowly lead to be a strategic re-orientation of trade unions and 
especially of the European trade union federations towards other instruments of 
transnational employment relations. At the moment it seems that the European 
trade unions consider transnational company agreements a more dynamic arena of 
European level social dialogue than EWCs as the imply eff ective collective bargaining 
among management and trade union representatives, whereas EWCs have no 
bargaining rights and are oft en very heterogeneous and complex bodies with huge 
diffi  culties to reach common interest articulation. However, today there is no legal 
framework for such agreements between trade unions and companies. 
A fi nal but not at all minor fi nding of our study is the absence of reliable data 
on the compliance rate of the EWC Directive. Th e ETUI EWC Database includes 
only the existing EWCs as reported by the national trade union organisations. Th e 
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absence of a formal register of companies covered by the Directive, as proposed 
repeatedly by trade unions constitutes a lost opportunity for the revitalization of 
the process (Buschak 2004; ETUI 2008). Th e opposition of employers and the lack 
of interest of the European institutions leave this substantial piece of an emerging 
European industrial relations system without the necessary information base and 
make it diffi  cult for trade unions to identify potential companies covered by the 
Directive. Arguably, an EWC is an instrument of employment relations that employee 
representative of some companies might not need. However, we insist that workers 
throughout Europe should be informed about whether their employer is covered by 
the Directive in order to be able to make use of this instrument.
Th e EWC Directive has opened an important institutional fi eld to develop 
employee representation and participation structures at European level but our 
fi ndings, in line with other studies, reveal a clearly underdeveloped fi eld. Labour’s 
energy for enhancing information and consultation rights does not keep up with the 
pace of transnational corporate restructuring and economic integration. Employers 
effi  ciently block or downgrade the eff ective operation of these information and 
consultation bodies whereas political and trade union organisations seem to lose 
interest in their further empowerment. Th e scientifi c community does not draw 
signifi cant attention to the reasons for the unused potential of EWCs, thus leaving an 
important gap in the literature. For the future research agenda, quantitative research 
as presented here will need to be combined and enhanced with qualitative research 
on the actual processes and outcomes of EWCs.
Th e recast EWC Directive 2009/38/EC establishes a new deadline for a further 
revision process to be completed in June 2016. Th is should be taken as an opportunity 
by trade unions and political groups interested in the social dimension of the 
European Union to revitalise the process of EWC creation and empowerment. Th e 
aim should be to convert the EWC from a song-and-dance act into an eff ective 
bargaining partner for central company management (Euro-Workscouncil 2011).
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